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SYMPOSIUM ARTICLE
Climate Litigation in the Global South:
Constraints and Innovations†
Joana Setzer* and Lisa Benjamin**
Abstract
Cases involving climate change have been litigated in the courts for some time, but new direc-
tions and trends have started to emerge. While the majority of climate litigation has occurred
in the United States and other developed countries, cases in the Global South are growing both
in terms of quantity and in the quality of their strategies and regulatory outcomes. However,
so far climate litigation in theGlobal South has received scant attention from the literature.We
argue that climate litigation in the Global South opens up avenues for progress in addressing
climate change in highly vulnerable countries. We first highlight some of the capacity con-
straints experienced in Global South countries to provide context for the emerging trend of
strategic climate litigation in the area. In spite of significant constraints experienced, the
strategies adopted by litigants push the climate litigation agenda forward as a result of their
outward-looking objective of combating ongoing environmental degradation, and, on a doc-
trinal level, the way in which they link climate change and human rights. Bearing in mind the
limitations resulting from the selective nature of the cases examined, we draw upon Legal
Opportunity Structures (LOS) approaches and identify two reasons for innovative cases
and outcomes in Global South strategic climate litigation: (i) how litigants are either
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overcoming or using procedural requirements for access to environmental justice, and (ii) the
existence of progressive legislative and judicial approaches to climate change. The strategies
and outcomes from these judicial approaches in the Global South might be able to contribute
to the further development of transnational climate change litigation.
Keywords: Climate change litigation, Global South, Human rights, Legal Opportunity
Structures
1. 
Cases involving climate change have been litigated in the courts for some time, but new
directions and trends have started to emerge. While the majority of climate litigation
has occurred in the United States (US) and other developed countries, cases in the
Global South1 are growing both in terms of quantity and in the quality of their regulatory
outcomes. Over the past years, cases of strategic climate litigation have been initiated in
Brazil, Colombia, India, Indonesia, Pakistan, the Philippines, and South Africa. These
cases push forward climate jurisprudence in the chosen jurisdictions, and perhaps even
beyond to other Global South countries. Despite resource and governance constraints,
some strategic cases from the Global South have achieved bold outcomes. Yet, so far cli-
mate litigation in the Global South has received scant attention in the literature.
In this articlewe teaseout some initialfindings froma selectionof strategic climate cases
filed in the Global South. Admittedly, the reliance on a small number of strategic cases, in
selected jurisdictions, offers a limited picture of climate litigation in the Global South.
Nevertheless, this narrow focus is a useful entry point to investigate how climate change
is being adjudicated in the area.We are interested in exploring how these positive judicial
outcomes have been achieved, given the capacity constraints experienced by these and
other countries in the Global South, particularly around the environmental rule of law.
Ultimately, the strategies and outcomes from these courts in the Global South might be
able to contribute to the development of transnational climate change litigation.2
1 Defining the groupings of poorer countries in the world has been subject to much debate. The terms
‘Third World’, ‘developing world’ and ‘Global South’ originated in different periods and have been con-
tested in terms of their utility and appropriateness. Today, the term ‘Global South’ (and its counterpart
‘Global North’) is the favoured option by scholars and policymakers. It is based on an earlier ‘North–
South’ distinction of the 1980s, but the prefix ‘Global’ clarifies that this is not a geographical categoriza-
tion of theworld, but one based on economic inequalities, thoughwith some spatial resonance in terms of
where the countries are situated: S.H. Chant & C. McIlwaine, Geographies of Development in the 21st
Century: An Introduction to the Global South (Edward Elgar, 2008), pp. 6, 11. Yet, within ‘Global
South’ countries, there are different layers of development and legal capacity. The Global South countries
that we consider in this article are all relatively affluent and have fairly strong civil societies and legal
systems.
2 Traditionally, the term ‘transnational litigation’ refers to claims involving foreign plaintiffs or defendants
located outside the court’s jurisdiction, and/or the possibility of enforcing foreign judgments in domestic
courts: see M.S. Quintanilla & C.A. Whytock, ‘Transnational Litigation: Foreign Courts, Foreign
Judgments, and Foreign Law’ (2011) 18(1) Southwestern Journal of International Law, pp. 31–52, at
32. Looking specifically at transnational climate litigation in the US, see M. Byers, F. Kelsey &
A. Gage, ‘The Internationalization of Climate Damages Litigation’ (2017) 7(2) Washington Journal of
Environmental Law& Policy, pp. 264–319. Scholars of climate litigation also describe climate litigation
as ‘transnational’ in that it is part of a ‘global’ climate justice movement, even where cases involve only
domestic litigants and decisions of domestic courts: see J. Peel& J. Lin, ‘Transnational Climate Litigation:
Transnational Environmental Law2
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We begin by considering the significant capacity constraints for climate litigation to
develop in the Global South. This examination provides context for the characteristics
of this initial trend of innovation in the countries where strategic climate litigation has
been brought. We then identify initial trends in Global South climate litigation. To a
certain extent, climate cases in this area follow trends observed in the Global North.
However, Global South climate litigation has unique characteristics that are distinct
from those observed in the Global North. Strategic approaches to and outcomes of liti-
gation in the Global South reflect these different characteristics.
Evenwhere the contours (for example, strategies and legal grounds) of Global North
and Global South climate litigation are similar, we observe that the context and content
of the filing is ‘painted in different colours’. This is the case with constitutional rights or
human rights claims, on which litigants in both the Global North and South have
relied. However, in Global South countries the character of human rights claims is
arguably more desperate because of the high vulnerability of their populations to
climate-induced risks and loss and damage, as well as their limited access to life-
sustaining resources.3 For example, an innovative approach to corporate liability was
used in the Carbon Majors Inquiry carried out by the Philippines Human Rights
Commission in the context of loss and damage suffered by its citizens as a result of
an extreme event which killed over 6,000 people.4 In Future Generations v. Ministry
of the Environment and Others, the Supreme Court of Colombia also focused on the
issue of human rights, but went further to discuss intergenerational equality and soli-
darity, private liability and accountability for climate change, human dependence on
the environment, and recognized Colombia’s Amazon basin as an entity the subject
of rights.5
Otherwise, the trends in Global South climate litigation reflect the priorities of the
jurisdiction in which the action is commenced. These lawsuits are purposely adapted
to address challenges that are generally more acute in developing countries. Indeed,
while a number of landmark cases of strategic climate litigation in the Global North
are targeted at driving governmental ambition on climate change, litigants from the
Global South are more likely to use litigation to compel governments to enforce existing
policies for mitigation and adaptation, attempting to overcome implementation con-
straints. For example, in Ashgar Leghari v. Federation of Pakistan, the court ordered
a number of regulatory outcomes in the face of delay and lack of action on climate
The Contribution of the Global South’ (2019) 113(4) American Journal of International Law, pp. 679–
726.
3 L. Kotzé, ‘Human Rights, the Environment and the Global South’, in S. Alam et al. (eds), International
Environmental Law and the Global South (Cambridge University Press, 2015), pp. 171–91, at 178–9.
4 The term ‘carbon majors’ and the Carbon Majors Inquiry are underpinned by a study published by
R. Heede, ‘Tracing Anthropogenic Carbon Dioxide and Methane Emissions to Fossil Fuel and Cement
Producers, 1854–2010’ (2014) 122(1–2) Climatic Change, pp. 229–41. Documents and other informa-
tion about the Inquiry are available at: https://essc.org.ph/content/nicc.
5 P.A.A. Alvarado & D. Rivas-Ramírez, ‘A Milestone in Environmental and Future Generations’ Rights
Protection: Recent Legal Developments before the Colombian Supreme Court’ (2018) 30(3) Journal of
Environmental Law, pp. 519–26; and P. Villavicencio Calzadilla, ‘A Paradigm Shift in Courts’ View
on Nature: The Atrato River and Amazon Basin Cases in Colombia’ (2019) 15(0) Law, Environment
and Development Journal, pp. 1–11, available at: http://www.lead-journal.org/content/19001.pdf.
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change adaptation by government agencies on the basis of human rights violations.6 In
a related vein, Peel and Lin suggest that Global South litigation connects the ‘peripheral’
nature of climate issues towider disputes over constitutional rights, environmental pro-
tection, land use, disaster management and natural resource conservation.7 For
example, in EarthLife Africa Johannesburg v. Minister of Environmental Affairs &
Others, the South African High Court determined that global climate change was a
relevant consideration in the environmental review of plans for a new coal-fired plant.8
Based on these characteristics, and drawing upon Legal Opportunity Structures
(LOS) approaches, we identify two related factors that are driving and contributing
to the initial regulatory outcomes observed in Global South strategic climate litigation:
(i) access to justice in conjunction with the existence of progressive climate and/or
environmental rights legislation, and (ii) judicial opportunism. When these factors
are combined, they have the potential to help actors in the Global South to overcome
countervailing dynamics of significant capacity constraints in implementing environ-
mental legislation and managing fragmented and under-resourced institutional struc-
tures, and can therefore contribute to progressive outcomes.
Taking into consideration the initial trends of climate litigation in the Global South
and the factors that contribute to this movement, we anticipate that strategic climate
litigation in this area is likely to increase in the coming years. Moreover, it may lead
to outcomes that uphold or advance climate change protection, particularly around
climate change adaptation, in jurisdictions that have adopted progressive procedural
as well as regulatory approaches to environmental protection and justice. With more
countries in the Global South implementing procedural and regulatory innovations
in the environmental field, the new directions opened by progressive climate litigation
could provide lessons and clear avenues for other litigants. Yet, it remains to be seen
whether these specific instances of positive climate outcomes will remain cabined
within the progressive judicial environments of these specific countries, or whether
they may broaden to develop a distinct field of climate jurisprudence.
In Section 2, the article briefly reviews the capacity constraints that many Global
South countries experience in implementing international environmental law as well
as domestic environmental law. Section 3 identifies climate litigation trends in the
Global South. Section 4 identifies two key features of emerging Global South litigation,
highlighting their innovative characteristics, and comparing them with similar efforts
and outcomes of climate litigation in the Global North. Section 5 discusses two reasons
for these key features, which have arguably contributed to successful outcomes and
innovative initiatives. The final section identifies potential lessons and the impacts of
these successes in going forward.
6 Ashgar Leghari v. Federation of Pakistan, Case No. 25501/2015, Lahore High Court, Order of 4 Sept.
2015, available at: http://www.lse.ac.uk/GranthamInstitute/litigation/ashgar-leghari-v-federation-of-
pakistan-lahore-high-court-green-bench-2015.
7 Peel & Lin, n. 2 above, pp. 690–5, 703–4.
8 Earthlife Africa Johannesburg v.Minister of Environmental Affairs &Others, Case No. 65662/16, High
Court, Order of 8 Mar. 2017, available at: http://www.lse.ac.uk/GranthamInstitute/litigation/earthlife-
africa-johannesburg-v-minister-of-environmental-affairs-others.
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2.  -    
Many Global South countries have not traditionally viewed climate change as one of
their greatest threats, focusing instead on immediate needs for economic development,
poverty reduction, and energy security,9 as well as more immediate environmental
threats such as hazardous waste and safe drinking water.10 Because environmental
issues are intertwined with economic issues, international environmental law has
long been a site of intense contestation over environmental priorities and liability for
past harm.11 Some countries in the Global South viewed environmentalism as a luxury
that low-income countries could not afford to implement, and as a hurdle in achieving
poverty reduction and economic development.12 Past histories of colonialism, and post-
colonial global economic orders, have also led to environmental harm and poverty in
the Global South, thereby engendering further mistrust by these countries regarding
environmental protection efforts by the Global North.13
The international environmental law architecture also leads to constraints in
implementation in countries in the Global South. Many multilateral environmental
agreements have significant reporting requirements, as well as a number of annual con-
ferences which take place all over the world.14 Limited human and financial resources
in countries in the Global South mean they often struggle to maintain a presence at
these meetings and to comply with reporting requirements. The primary needs for
adequate financing, appropriate technology transfer, and effective dispute resolution
mechanisms in order to aid implementation in the Global South are yet to be met.15
Partly as a result, countries in the Global South often lack the capacity to build and
maintain effective environmental institutions, create strong scientific knowledge
bases for environmental policymaking, effectively integrate environmental concerns
into national economic development planning, and set up effective environmental
monitoring and implementation schemes. In addition, conflicts between environmental
protection and economic development are particularly pronounced in these countries
as a result of policy priorities focused on development projects which target foreign
direct investment.16
9 O. Mertz et al., ‘Adaptation to Climate Change in Developing Countries’ (2009) 43(5) Environmental
Management, pp. 743–52, at 744; M. Bazilian et al., ‘Interactions between Energy Security and
Climate Change: A Focus on Developing Countries’ (2011) 39(6) Energy Policy, pp. 3750–6, at 3750.
However, there are a number of countries in the Global South where for many years climate change
has been considered a priority (e.g., small island developing states).
10 S. Atapattu & C.G. Gonzalez, ‘The North-South Divide in International Environmental Law: Framing
the Issues’, in Alam et al., n. 3 above, pp. 1–21, at 10.
11 Ibid., p. 2.
12 R. Gordon, ‘Unsustainable Development’, in Alam et al., n. 3 above, pp. 50–73, at 50.
13 Atapattu & Gonzalez, n. 10 above, p. 5.
14 V.P. Nanda, ‘Global Environmental Governance and the South’, in Alam et al., n. 3 above, pp. 130–51, at
135.
15 Ibid., p. 146.
16 E. Emeseh, ‘Limitations of Law in Promoting Synergy between Environment and Development Policies in
Developing Countries: ACase Study of the Petroleum Industry inNigeria’ (2006) 24(4) Journal of Energy
Natural Resources, pp. 574–606, at 598; C. Lo & G. Fryxell, ‘Enforcement Strategies among
Environmental Protection Officials in China’ (2003) 23(2) Journal of Public Policy, pp. 81–115, at 83.
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Where environmental legislation exists, policymakers face an array of barriers to
enforcement, including weak and fragmented institutions, incomplete legal founda-
tions, and limited political will.17 Many countries lack the resources, infrastructure,
technology, and monitoring facilities needed to support effective enforcement.
Additionally, environmental legislation may be outdated, or may not match existing
technical, economic, and human resource limitations.18 Environmental legislation
also often requires the establishment of new institutions. Where established, these are
often poorly resourced, with fragmented institutional structures where administrators
may operate in silos. In Brazil, for example, budgetary constraints, inappropriately
staffed agencies, as well as strong industrial and commercial lobbies have all hampered
enforcement of environmental legislation.19 In South Africa, the legacy of apartheid
and its consequential economic and spatial inequality has placed tremendous pressure
on policymakers to ensure energy security through cheap, and often fossil-fuel inten-
sive, energy sources.20
Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and environmental defenders often step
into these governance gaps, working with local communities to identify environmental
risks and impacts and promote human rights in the context of large-scale extraction
projects through the protection of biodiversity, water, and forestry.21Yet, some govern-
ments in the Global South restrict the activities of organizations that receive foreign
funding on the basis of maintaining transparency and accountability.22 Between
1993 and 2012, 39 of the world’s low and middle-income countries enacted laws
that restrict the activities of these organizations.23Moreover, environmental defenders
are often subjected to threats, intimidation, physical violence, and even death. Murders
of environmental defenders are on the rise worldwide, and especially in resource-rich
countries.24 A report by Global Witness25 names 207 activists killed in 2017, with
Brazil, the Philippines, and Colombia listed as the most dangerous countries.
17 A. Blackman, ‘Can Voluntary Environmental Regulation Work in Developing Countries? Lessons from
Case Studies’ (2008) 36(1) The Policy Studies Journal, pp. 119–41, at 120; G. Eskeland & E. Jimenez,
‘Policy Instruments for Pollution Control in Developing Countries’ (1992) 7(2) The World Bank
Research Observer, pp. 145–69.
18 S. Singh & S. Rajamani, ‘Issue of Environmental Compliance in Developing Countries’ (2003) 47(12)
Water Science and Technology, pp. 301–4, at 301.
19 Ibid.
20 Bazilian et al., n. 9 above, p. 3754.
21 UN Environment, Environmental Rule of Law: First Global Report (UN Environment Programme
(UNEP), 2019), available at: https://www.unenvironment.org/resources/assessment/environmental-rule-
law-first-global-report.
22 Ibid., p. 157.
23 Ibid.
24 Ibid., p. 172.
25 Global Witness, ‘At What Cost? Irresponsible Business and the Murder of Land and Environmental
Defenders in 2017’, 24 July 2018 (updated Jan. 2019), available at: https://www.globalwitness.org/en/
campaigns/environmental-activists/at-what-cost. On the other hand, activists and even researchers in
the Global North suffer retaliation through the courts through strategic lawsuits against public participa-
tion (SLAPP) and lawsuits against researchers: see M. Poggio, ‘Fossil Fuel Industry Ally Targets
UCLA Law Professors’ Climate Liability Work’, Climate Liability News, 12 Dec. 2018, available at:
https://www.climateliabilitynews.org/2018/12/12/ucla-law-professor-ann-carlson-cara-horowitz-cei.
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Kellman has also documented threats to environmental public prosecutors who have
attempted to enforce environmental regulations in Brazil.26
Nevertheless, countries where progressive climate outcomes in litigation have been
experienced are all on the list of countries that are the most dangerous for environmen-
tal defenders, as documented between 2000 and 2015. Brazil is at the top of this list
with 527 defenders murdered, the Philippines is third with 115, Colombia fourth
with 103; lower on the list are Indonesia with 11, Pakistan with five, and South
Africa with one.27 Considering these constraints and pressures, it is remarkable that
strategic climate litigation in the Global South has appeared at all.
3.      
Over the last 20 years climate litigation has emerged as an alternative governance mech-
anism to address climate change.28 The contours of what constitutes climate litigation
are unclear, as the number of cases varies immensely, ranging from litigation around
government permits issued for fossil fuel projects to implementation of climate change
adaptation plans. Markell and Ruhl define climate litigation as any piece of federal,
state, tribal or local administrative or judicial litigation inwhich party filings or tribunal
decisions directly and expressly raise an issue of fact or law regarding the issue or policy
of climate change, its causes or impacts.29 Peel and Osofsky define it as involving cases
that have the issue of climate change at their core, and that generally raise climate-
specific arguments or judicial analysis referring to climate change.30 They also provide
a model for understanding the regulatory impact of climate change, with litigation
focused on three main areas: (i) constitutional interpretation, (ii) statutory interpre-
tation (including procedural and substantive requirements), and (iii) under common
law, nuisance, negligence, and public trust areas of law.31
It is generally recognized that the first climate legal action was brought in the US in
1990,32 while the first case expressing itself as climate litigation is understood to have
been initiated inNew SouthWales (Australia) in 1994.33As ofMay 2019, almost 1,300
26 J. Kellman, ‘The Brazilian Legal Tradition and Environmental Protection: Friend or Foe’ (2002) 25(2)
Hastings International & Comparative Law Review, pp. 145–67, at 164.
27 UN Environment, n. 21 above, p. 173, Fig. 4.8.
28 J. Peel & H.M. Osofsky, Climate Change Litigation: Regulatory Pathways to Cleaner Energy
(Cambridge University Press, 2015), pp. 9–25.
29 D. Markell & J.B. Ruhl, ‘An Empirical Assessment of Climate Change in the Courts: A New
Jurisprudence or Business as Usual?’ (2012) 64(1) Florida Law Review, pp. 15–86, at 21.
30 Peel & Osofsky, n. 28 above, p. 4.
31 Ibid., p. 36.
32 B. Preston, ‘Climate Change Litigation (Part 1)’ (2011) 5(1) Carbon and Climate Law Review, pp. 3–14,
at 8.
33 B. Preston, ‘Recent Climate Litigation Concerning Environmental Rights’, presentation given at the
Asia Pacific Judicial Colloquium on Climate Change: Using Constitutions to Advance Environmental
Rights and Achieve Climate Justice, Lahore High Court in Pakistan, 26 Feb. 2018, available at:
https://www.ajne.org/event/asia-pacific-judicial-colloquium-climate-change#quicktabs-event_tabs=2.
Judge Preston was referring to Greenpeace Australia Ltd v. Redbank Power Co., available at:
http://www.lse.ac.uk/GranthamInstitute/litigation/greenpeace-australia-ltd-v-redbank-power-co-land-and-
environment-court-of-new-south-wales-1994 (in which the Land and Environment Court of New South
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lawsuits and administrative investigations involving climate change were identified in
28 jurisdictions, with over 1,000 cases filed in the US.34 The increase in the number
of climate-related litigation cases has been attributed to worsening climatic conditions
and to the use of litigation as a strategy aimed at drawing public attention to the issue of
climate change and increasing the political will to tackle it.35 These climate lawsuits are
concentrated in a relatively small number of jurisdictions, most of them in the Global
North. The US has been at the centre of the climate change litigation phenomenon.36
Australia has also experienced a high number of climate litigation cases (97),37 fol-
lowed by the United Kingdom (46), New Zealand (16), Canada (14), and Spain
(13). In the Global South, 32 cases of climate litigation have been identified, of
which over half are in Asia (18 cases), five are in Africa, and nine in Latin America.
Whereas Global North climate litigation began in the 1990s, such litigation in the
Global South started almost 20 years later, and became visible in the late 2010s.38
We still have a very limited understanding of how the Global South is engaging with cli-
mate change litigation,39 and the legislation and procedures that allow or facilitate legal
claims in that context.40Academic examination of climate litigation has been produced
mostly by scholars from theGlobal North and has focused primarily on a small number
of high-profile cases concentrated inNorthAmerica, Europe, andAustralia. The system-
atic analysis of climate litigation scholarship by Setzer andVanhala confirms this imbal-
ance, and calls for comprehensive studies focused on Global South litigation.41
Wales upheld a state council decision granting development consent for the construction of a power station.
Greenpeace asserted that air emissions from the power station would exacerbate the greenhouse effect).
34 For US cases, see the database maintained by the Sabin Center for Climate Change Law, in collaboration
with Arnold& Porter Kaye Scholer LLP, available at: http://climatecasechart.com/us-climate-change-liti-
gation. For cases in other jurisdictions, see the Climate Change Litigation of the World database, jointly
produced by the Sabin Center and the Grantham Research Institute on Climate Change and the
Environment at the London School of Economics, available at: http://www.lse.ac.uk/
GranthamInstitute/climate-change-laws-of-the-world. Examining trends in litigation, see J. Setzer &
M. Bangalore, ‘Regulating Climate Change in the Courts’, in A. Averchenkova, S. Fankhauser &
M. Nachmany (eds), Trends in Climate Change Legislation (Edward Elgar, 2017), pp. 175–92.
35 UN Environment and Sabin Center for Climate Change Law at Columbia University, The Status of
Climate Change Litigation: A Global Review (UNEP, 2017), p. 4, available at: http://wedocs.unep.org/
handle/20.500.11822/20767.
36 Ibid., p. 10.
37 J. Peel & H.M. Osofsky, ‘Climate Change Litigation’s Regulatory Pathways: A Comparative Analysis of
the United States and Australia’ (2013) 35(3) Law & Policy, pp. 150–83.
38 For a comprehensive survey of these cases, see Peel & Lin, n. 2 above.
39 J. Lin, ‘Climate Change and the Courts’ (2012) 32(1) Legal Studies, pp. 35–57; J. Lin, ‘Climate Change
Litigation in Asia and the Pacific’, in G. van Calster, W. Vandenberghe & L. Reins (eds), Research
Handbook on Climate Change Mitigation Law (Edward Elgar, 2015), pp. 578–602; L. Vanhala, ‘The
Comparative Politics of Courts and Climate Change’ (2013) 22(3) Environmental Politics, pp. 447–
74; M. Wilensky, ‘Climate Change in the Courts: An Assessment of Non-U.S. Climate Litigation’
(2015) 26(1) Duke Environmental Law & Policy Forum, pp. 131–79.
40 Peel & Osofsky, n. 28 above, p. 62.
41 J. Setzer & L. Vanhala, ‘Climate Change Litigation: A Review of Research on Courts and Litigants in
Climate Governance’ (2019) WIREs Climate Change online articles, available at: https://onlinelibrary.
wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1002/wcc.580. Of the 130 articles identified up to Sept. 2018, 76% (99) focus
on Global North jurisdictions, 20% (26) have an international focus or cover jurisdictions in both the
North and South. Only 5 of the identified journal articles looked at litigation or litigation-related issues
in the Global South: X. He, ‘Legal and Policy Pathways of Climate Change Adaptation: Comparative
Transnational Environmental Law8
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In other areas of law, scholars have pointed to the fact that jurisprudence coming
from the South might be used to develop legal jurisprudence and political issues in
Northern jurisdictions. While Global South scholars and legal institutions occupy a
marginal position in the interpretation, use, and transformation of modern constitu-
tionalism, a number of creative courts in the Global South have contributed (or have
attempted to contribute) to the structural transformation of the public and private
spheres of their countries.42 A study of courts in Asia, Africa, and Latin America con-
cludes that many of these are ‘activist tribunals’, and that some of their jurisprudence
contributes directly to the ongoing global conversation on constitutionalism, bringing
new light to interpreting the principle of separation of powers, connecting social
and economic rights with the principle of human dignity and strategies to allow poor
individuals access to justice.43
4.        
We compare Global South strategic climate litigation with that of the Global North,
highlighting two key features of emerging Global South litigation: the outward-looking
objective of combating ongoing environmental degradation, and, on a doctrinal level,
the use of rights-based principles.44 Unlike strategic climate litigation in the Global
North, litigants in the Global South currently do not focus on eliciting new regulatory
targets or instruments from governments on reducing emissions. Rather, they use
existing legislative tools and human rights discourses to highlight the vulnerability of
their populations to climate change and protect their valuable ecosystems. By compar-
ing the two approaches, we do not diminish either strategy, but rather aim to contrast a
more recent trend in litigation in the Global South in relation to the more established
trend in the Global North. There are different levels of synergies and distinctions
between litigation in the Global South and the Global North, and these are also
highlighted below.
Analysis of the Adaptation Practices in the United States, Australia and China’ (2018) 7(2) Transnational
Environmental Law, pp. 347–73; T.-L. Humby, ‘The Thabametsi Case: Case No 65662/16 Earthlife
Africa Johannesburg v Minister of Environmental Affairs’ (2018) 30(1) Journal of Environmental
Law, pp. 145–55; C. Nyinevi, ‘Universal Civil Jurisdiction: An Option for Global Justice in Climate
Change Litigation’ (2015) 8(3) Journal of Politics and Law, pp. 135–48, available at: https://ssrn.com/
abstract=2650371; J. Williams, ‘The Impact of Climate Change on Indigenous People: The
Implications for the Cultural, Spiritual, Economic and Legal Rights of Indigenous People’ (2012)
16(4) The International Journal of Human Rights, pp. 648–88; B. Ugochukwu, ‘Litigating the Impacts
of Climate Change: The Challenge of Legal Polycentricity’ (2018) 7(1) Global Journal of Comparative
Law, pp. 91–114. Since their assessment other articles have been published, including Alvarado &
Rivas-Ramírez (n. 5 above), and a forthcoming comprehensive analysis by Peel and Lin (n. 2 above).
42 M. Hailbronner, ‘Transformative Constitutionalism: Not only in the Global South’ (2017) 65(3)
American Journal of Comparative Law, pp. 527–65.
43 D.B. Maldonado, Constitutionalism of the Global South: The Activist Tribunals of India, South Africa,
and Colombia (Cambridge University Press, 2013).
44 Peel & Lin (n. 2 above) identify a number of key characteristics of climate cases in the Global South,
including reliance on constitutional rights or human rights claims, and that individuals and NGOs in
the Global South are using litigation to compel their governments to implement and enforce existing pol-
icies for mitigation and adaptation – and, rather surprisingly, most cases currently comprise mitigation.
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4.1. Combating Ongoing Environmental Degradation
A number of landmark strategic climate litigation cases in the Global North are tar-
geted at driving governmental ambition on climate change. The Urgenda case has so
far been successful in determining that the Dutch government needs to reduce its emis-
sions to 25% below 1990 levels by 2020.45 In Juliana v. United States the plaintiffs
claim that governmental failure to take action on climate change will deprive future
generations of the same protection provided to previous generations.46 While the
case has faced significant procedural hurdles regarding standing,47 if successful it
could direct the US government to develop a plan to reduce carbon dioxide (CO2) emis-
sions.48Urgenda and Juliana have inspired other cases, including a lawsuit brought by
Friends of the Irish Environment against the Irish government for alleged failure to
mitigate climate change, and a legal challenge brought by the NGO ENvironnement
JEUnesse against the Canadian government for alleged failure to protect the fundamen-
tal rights of young people.49 Similarly, in France four NGOs have taken a first step
towards a lawsuit against the state by submitting a formal notice to the French Prime
Minister and 12 members of the government for their inadequate efforts to effectively
tackle climate change, in violation of a statutory duty to act.50
In contrast to this approach, rather than requesting direct regulatory action on
climate change by governments, plaintiffs in the Global South take a more indirect
route. Cases are brought to address poor enforcement of existing planning and/or
environmental legislation, possibly acknowledging the capacity constraints involved
in passing new legislation on climate change in some jurisdictions. In addition, these
cases tend to include efforts to protect important native ecosystems. A common strategy
in the Global South has been for governments to engagewith climate change arguments
through taking action against defendants for enforcement of existing environmental
45 Stichting Urgenda v. Government of the Netherlands (Ministry of Infrastructure and the Environment),
ECLI:NL:RBDHA:2015:7145, Rechtbank Den Haag, C/09/456689/HA ZA 13-1396 (Urgenda). See
also J. van Zeben, ‘Establishing a Governmental Duty of Care for Climate Change Mitigation: Will
Urgenda Turn the Tide? (2015) 4(2) Transnational Environmental Law, pp. 339–57.
46 Juliana et al. v. United States of America et al., F.Supp.3d 1224, 1236 (D. Or. 2016); M.C. Blumm &
M.C. Wood, ‘No Ordinary Lawsuit: Climate Change, Due Process and the Public Trust Doctrine’
(2017) 67(1) American University Law Review, pp. 1–87.
47 In Oct. 2018 Chief Justice Roberts granted a temporary halt in response to a request by the federal gov-
ernment. The Supreme Court subsequently lifted the stay on 2 Nov., and the Department of Justice sub-
sequently requested a stay from the US District Court for the District of Oregon, which granted in part a
temporary stay on 9 Nov. 2018.
48 Blumm & Wood, n. 46 above. See also J. Peel & H.M. Osofsky, ‘A Rights Turn in Climate Change
Litigation?’ (2018) 7(1) Transnational Environmental Law, pp. 37–67, and P. Singer, ‘The Trial of the
Century, Fighting for a Healthier Planet’, The Daily Star, 15 Sept. 2018, available at: http://www.daily-
star.com.lb/Opinion/Commentary/2018/Sep-15/463429-the-trial-of-the-century-fighting-for-a-health-
ier-planet.ashx.
49 Friends of the Irish Environment v. Ireland, available at: http://www.lse.ac.uk/GranthamInstitute/litigation/
friends-of-the-irish-environment-v-ireland; ENvironnement JEUnesse v. Canada, available at:
http://www.lse.ac.uk/GranthamInstitute/litigation/environnement-jeunesse-v-canada.
50 See Greenpeace France et al., ‘Inaction over Climate Change : Let’s Fight for Justice’, available at:
https://notreaffaireatous.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/12/CP-ANGLAIS.pdf.
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and planning legislation.51 This is the case for enforcement actions brought by the
Ministry of Environment of Indonesia against companies in the extractive sector
(mining, oil palm, and timber logging) for violations of natural resource management
laws.52 This strategy has also been used in different environmental class actions
brought by the Brazilian Prosecutor’s office for violations of natural resource manage-
ment laws (e.g., unauthorized clearing of forest for the development of economic
activities).53
NGOs in the Global South have also started to use the courts to enforce legislation
regarding the licensing of polluting activities. Peel and Lin54 identify five out of the 32
cases in the Global South docket that referred to environmental impact assessment
(EIA) or used this as one of the grounds of action. Some of these cases have climate
change in the ‘periphery’ of the claim (e.g., the final decision might result in benefits
from a climate mitigation perspective55), while others have climate change as their
‘core’ (e.g., the lack of consideration of climate impacts challenges the validity of
the approval given). The case of Earthlife Africa Johannesburg v. Minister of
Environmental Affairs andOthers provides an example of climate change being central
to the case. Humby argues that the case made a ‘meaningful contribution’ to climate
change litigation as, notwithstanding the absence of an express legal obligation to con-
duct a focused climate change impact assessment, the Gauteng High Court ruled that
climate change is a relevant consideration when granting an environmental
authorization.56
Other climate litigation suits in the Global South focus on the destruction of
emblematic ecosystems. By doing this, climate litigation gives continuity to ongoing
efforts in the environmental movement. For example, in Future Generations
v. Ministry of the Environment and Others, a group of 25 children and young adults
between the ages of 7 and 26 required the government to comply with its prior commit-
ment to stop deforestation in the Amazon forest by 2020. This lawsuit was the first on
climate change and future generations in Latin America and concerned a long-standing
problem: the conservation, maintenance, and restoration of the Amazon forest.
Attempts to address deforestation in the Amazon have been made for over several
51 Peel & Lin, n. 2 above, p. 717.
52 For a discussion about climate change litigation in Indonesia, see A.G. Wibisana & C.M. Cornelius,
‘Climate Change Litigation in Indonesia’, working paper presented at the Climate Change Litigation
Scholarship Workshop, Faculty of Law, National University of Singapore, 7–8 June 2018.
53 For an analysis of cases decided by the Brazilian courts, see G. Wedy, ‘Climate Legislation and Litigation
in Brazil’, Sabin Center for Climate Change Law Working Papers, Oct. 2017, available at:
http://columbiaclimatelaw.com/files/2017/10/Wedy-2017-10-Climate-Legislation-and-Litigation-in-
Brazil.pdf; and, in Portuguese, J. Setzer, K. Cunha & A. Botter-Fabri (eds), Climate Litigation: New
Frontiers for Environmental Law in Brazil (Thompson Reuters/Revista dos Tribunais, 2019).
54 Peel & Lin, n. 2 above pp. 704–5. Of these 5 cases they identify, 1 was in Asia and 4 in Africa.
55 However, as Bouwer argues, ‘peripheric’ climate litigation cases that interface with climate policy might
also undermine domestic climate change policy: K. Bouwer, ‘The Unsexy Future of Climate Change
Litigation’ (2018) 30(3) Journal of Environmental Law, pp. 483–506.
56 Humby (n. 41 above) analyzes the Thabametsi case through the lens of Preston’s conceptual framework
for the judiciary to make a ‘meaningful contribution’ to tackling climate change: see B. Preston,
‘The Contribution of the Courts in Tackling Climate Change’ (2016) 28(1) Journal of Environmental
Law, pp. 11–7.
Joana Setzer and Lisa Benjamin 11
of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S2047102519000268
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. LSE London School of Economics, on 02 Jan 2020 at 17:13:05, subject to the Cambridge Core terms
decades through various legal and non-legal strategies,57 but this particular case is
being framed in terms of its climate impacts and brought as a climate lawsuit.58
4.2. Vulnerability and Rights-based Claims in the Global South
Despite human rights and climate change linkages becoming increasingly under-
stood,59 courts were initially reluctant to adjudicate in ways that highlight these link-
ages.60 However, the international framework of human rights is well established
and can provide existing principles and frameworks within which climate litigation
and judicial decision making operate. For instance, the human rights-based approach
established by the United Nations (UN) can provide procedural and substantive protec-
tion to citizens in the context of climate impacts, and can help to ensure that
development-based projects do not result in adverse human rights consequences.61
Consequently, over the last few years the legal relationship between human rights
and climate change has started to emerge in courts to a point where Peel and
Osofsky have identified a ‘rights-based turn’ in climate litigation.62 The lawsuits
brought by Urgenda, Juliana et al. and JEUnesse all focused on issues of vulnerability
and human rights violations. Urgenda grounded the case on the duty of care under
Article 21 of the Dutch Constitution and Article 6:162 of the Dutch Civil Code to
ensure ‘the livability of the country and the protection and improvement of the living
environment’.63 The District Court of the Hague decided that Article 6:162 of the
Civil Codewas breached by a tortious act committed by the state – the act of hazardous
negligence of not taking adequate action to prevent climate harm. Interestingly, on
appeal, rather than accepting the duty of care from tort law, the Court of Appeal
ruled that the duty of carewas informed by human rights. The Court recognized a ‘posi-
tive obligation [of the state] to take concrete actions to prevent a future violation of
Articles 2 and 8 ECHR [European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights
57 Kellman, n. 26 above, p. 145.
58 The plaintiffs request the Court to order the state to act in various ways, which include (i) the design and
implementation of a national action plan as well as an intergenerational agreement to reduce deforest-
ation; (ii) upgrading the ‘Territorial Management Plan’; (iii) suspending the main activities that are the
cause of deforestation; (iv) investigating illicit activities that contribute to deforestation; and (v) revising
all public resources destined for the reduction of deforestation; available at: http://www.lse.ac.uk/
GranthamInstitute/litigation/future-generation-v-ministry-environment-others.
59 See J. Knox, ‘Climate Change and Human Rights Law’ (2009) 50(1) Virginia Journal of International
Law, pp. 163–218; and S. Humphreys & M. Robinson, Human Rights and Climate Change
(Cambridge University Press, 2010).
60 Setzer & Vanhala, n. 41 above; also S. Atapattu, Human Rights Approaches to Climate Change:
Challenges and Opportunities (Routledge, 2016).
61 D.S. Olawuyi, ‘Advancing Climate Justice in National Climate Actions: The Promise and Limitations of
the United Nations Human Rights-Based Approaches’, in R.S. Abate (ed.), Climate Justice: Case Studies
in Global and Regional Governance Challenges (Environmental Law Institute, 2016), pp. 3–24, at 7.
62 Peel & Osofsky, n. 48 above.
63 Stichting Urgenda v. Government of the Netherlands (Ministry of Infrastructure and the Environment),
Rechtbank Den Haag, 24 June 2015, ECLI:NL:RBDHA:2015:7196, para. 4.36, English translation
available at: http://deeplink.rechtspraak.nl/uitspraak?id=ECLI:NL:RBDHA:2015:7196. See van Zeben,
n. 45 above.
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and Fundamental Freedoms64]’.65 In doing so, the Court of Appeal ruled that danger-
ous climate change would result ‘in the serious risk that the current generation of citi-
zens will be confronted with loss of life and/or a disruption of family life’.66 In Juliana
v. United States, young people claim that failure by the government to take action on
climate change violates their Fifth Amendment rights by denying protection to future
generations of essential natural resources, including a safe climate.67 The plaintiffs
are also relying on the public trust doctrine, and the violation of rights to life, liberty
and property, as well as failing to protect public natural resources. The Environment
JEUnesse case against the Canadian government claims violation of the fundamental
rights of young people under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms and the
Québec Charter of Rights and Freedoms.68
The application of the human rights framework to the impacts of climate change has
been one of the key features of litigation in the Global South. In addition to the reasons
why rights-based cases are being brought in the Global North, many countries in the
Global South have constitutions which already provide for human rights protection,
as well as agencies or commissions which oversee the implementation and operational-
ization of those rights.69 Also, historically marginalized communities in the Global
South have successfully vindicated collective human rights in regional human rights
bodies, and some national courts have a record of innovation in human rights and
environmental rights.70 The role of progressive legislation and judges will be further
discussed in the next section when we examine the rationale for strategic climate
litigation and innovative decisions in the Global South.
The socio-economic and political contexts of Global South jurisdictions are also
relevant. Colonial and postcolonial activities of Northern countries, combined with
multinational corporate actors, have caused drains on wealth, dysfunctional institu-
tions, rent-seeking elites, and ethnic conflicts, which have led to grave human rights
abuses and environmental destruction.71Consequently, the environment/human rights
nexus is often closely related to issues of equity, survival, security, human capital
64 Rome (Italy), 4 Nov. 1950, in force 3 Sept. 1953, available at: http://www.echr.coe.int/pages/home.aspx?
p=basictexts.
65 Court of Appeal of the Hague, The State of the Netherlands (Ministry of Infrastructure and the
Environment) v. Urgenda Foundation, C/09/456689 / HA ZA 13-1396, 9 Oct. 2018, para. 41 (quota-
tions from the translation provided by the Court) available at: https://uitspraken.rechtspraak.nl/inziendo-
cument?id=ECLI:NL:GHDHA:2018:2610). See also B. Mayer, The State of the Netherlands v.Urgenda
Foundation: Ruling of the Court of Appeal of The Hague (9 October 2018) (2019) 8(1) Transnational
Environmental Law, pp. 167–92.
66 Urgenda, ibid., para. 45.
67 N. 46 above.
68 N. 49 above.
69 This is the case for the countries mentioned in this article. See ‘Constitute Project’, available at:
https://www.constituteproject.org; and UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR),
Human Rights and Constitution Making (UN, 2018), available at: https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/
Publications/ConstitutionMaking_EN.pdf.
70 See C.G. Gonzalez, ‘Environmental Justice, Human Rights, and the Global South’ (2015) 13(1) Santa
Clara Journal of International Law, pp. 151–96, at 165; also Maldonado, n. 43 above and Section 5
below.
71 Kotzé, n. 3 above, pp. 178–9.
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development, and defunct governance practices, making human rights violations par-
ticularly pertinent in the Global South.72
The application of a human rights framework to the impacts of climate change is
particularly relevant in the Global South because populations in these countries are
extremely vulnerable. The most recent report of the Intergovernmental Panel on
Climate Change (IPCC) states that climate-related risks for natural and human systems
are higher for global warming of 1.5 degrees Celsius (°C) than is the case at present, but
are lower than for the risks related to a 2°C rise above pre-industrial levels.73 The
impact of the risks will depend not only on the magnitude and rate of warming but
also on geographic locations, levels of development and vulnerability, and choices of
adaptation and mitigation.74 Disadvantaged and vulnerable populations, indigenous
people, and local communities who are highly dependent on agriculture or coastal live-
lihoods are at disproportionately higher risk.75 Poverty and disadvantage are likely to
increase in vulnerable populations as global warming increases.76 Countries in the tro-
pics and southern hemisphere subtropics have populations that will be exposed to the
greatest impacts on economic growth as a result of climate change should global warm-
ing increase from 1.5°C to 2°C, and the number of people who are exposed to
climate-related risks and are susceptible to poverty may reach up to several hundred
million by 2050.77
For the above reasons, a human rights framework is particularly relevant in building
a compelling climate justice narrative in the Global South. This narrative enhances pol-
itical will for greater ambition in climate policy formation, and also provides vulnerable
countries and communities with the opportunity to account for their experience of cli-
mate impacts.78
However, the adoption and implementation of a human rights approach in the con-
text of climate change in the Global South is a complex issue for a number of reasons.
Firstly, the traditionally vertical relationship between the state and individual for the
enforcement of human rights violations does not take into account the historic respon-
sibility of the Global North for the impacts of climate change. A human rights approach
also imposes obligations, with consequential costs, to manage and mitigate the impacts
of climate change on some countries that are least responsible for climate change, which
has obvious equity implications. Therefore, a climate justice framework may be more
72 Ibid., p. 179.
73 IPCC, ‘Summary for Policymakers’, in V. Masson-Delmotte et al. (eds), Global Warming of 1.5°C:
An IPCC Special Report on the Impacts of Global Warming of 1.5°C above Pre-industrial Levels and
Related Global Greenhouse Gas Emission Pathways, in the Context of Strengthening the Global
Response to the Threat of Climate Change, Sustainable Development, and Efforts to Eradicate
Poverty (IPCC, 2018 forthcoming), pp. 1–24, p. 5, available at: https://www.ipcc.ch/sr15.
74 Ibid., p. 8.
75 Ibid., p. 11.
76 Ibid.
77 Ibid., pp. 11–2.
78 E. Cameron & M. Limon, ‘Restoring the Climate by Realizing Rights: The Role of the International
Human Rights System’ (2012) 21(3) Review of European, Comparative & International
Environmental Law, pp. 204–19, at 204.
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appropriate, particularly for smaller nations.79 Despite these inequities, developing
countries have agreed to take on obligations under the Paris Agreement80 to address
climate change, albeit in an approach that is nationally determined with differentiated
obligations for developing countries.81
In addition, human rights-based approaches face practical constraints at the national
level in Global South countries.82 As Olawuyi notes, human rights have varying levels
of protection and implementation in countries where climate injustices are most severe,
and local challenges such as the inadequacy or absence of climate change laws, restrict-
ive property laws or inadequate capacity and lack of resources impacts upon the
capacity of vulnerable groups to invoke human rights norms to seek redress.83
Vulnerable countries may fear using a human rights narrative which would invite the
international community to interrogate their own questionable human rights records,
particularly in the area of political and civil rights.84
Notwithstanding these considerable complexities and constraints, a number of cases
in the Global South have invoked the issue of human rights violations arising from the
impacts of climate change, and they have seen progressive outcomes. In Leghari
v. Federation of Pakistan85 Judge Syad Mansoor Ali Shah provided an extensive deci-
sion, in which he listed the impacts of climate change in Pakistan and focused on the
vulnerability of citizens in that country, referring to climate change as ‘a defining
issue of our time’.86 While the Pakistani Constitution did not contain a specific right
of environmental protection, the judge focused on Articles 9 and 11 of the
Constitution protecting the rights to life, human dignity, property, and access to infor-
mation, combined with international environmental law principles such as sustainable
development, the precautionary principle, the public trust doctrine, and inter-
generational equity. He determined that together these provisions provided a sufficient
judicial toolkit for him to make a positive decision on the impacts of climate change.
A further case brought by a youth petitioner in Pakistan claims that climate change
harm continuously threatens mental and physical health and quality of life. It violates
the constitutionally guaranteed right to life, and the fundamental rights of the youth
79 S. Atapattu, ‘Justice for Small Island Nations: Intersections of Equity, Human Rights and Environmental
Justice’, in Abate, n. 61 above, pp. 299–322.
80 Paris (France), 12 Dec. 2015, in force 4 Nov. 2016, available at: https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/eng-
lish_paris_agreement.pdf.
81 Art. 3 Paris Agreement states that all countries are to take ambitious action.Moreover, Art. 4(3) notes that
all states’ nationally determined contributions will reflect their highest possible ambition while respecting
common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities, in the light of differing national cir-
cumstances. Art. 4(4) also folds in an element of differentiation by stating that developed countries should
take the lead by instituting economy-wide absolute emission reductions and developing countries should
enhance mitigation action and move, over time, towards economy-wide emissions reductions or limita-
tion targets.
82 Olawuyi, n. 61 above, pp. 6–7.
83 Ibid.
84 Cameron & Limon, n. 78 above, p. 206.
85 N. 6 above.
86 Ibid.
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petitioner, as well as future generations in Pakistan.87While the judicial approach in the
Leghari case may seem unusual, there is already a judicial precedent in Pakistan which
lends itself to such interventionist judicial activity. In 2012, the High Court of Lahore
ordered the establishment of the River Ravi Commission to manage the restoration of
the river, held periodic hearings on the Commission’s progress, and ordered full-scale
implementation of the bioremediation project in 2015.88
Similarly, in the Colombian climate case, Future Generations v. Ministry of the
Environment and Others, the Supreme Court was asked to rule on the impacts of cli-
mate change on the rights of future generations. The plaintiffs argued that the govern-
ment had failed to respect the constitutional rights of existing children to a healthy
environment, life, health, nutrition and water, as well as failing to protect the rights
of future generations.89 The Court’s decision relied on the ‘future generations’ argu-
ment to press the government to take action on climate change, including to mandate
the formulation and implementation of action plans to address deforestation in the
Amazon.90 With regard to standing, the decision applied the same constitutional pro-
visions used for the protection of the environment for current generations, but this time
to protect future generations, thereby substantially expanding the limits of such
rights.91
A new angle to existing human rights strategies was introduced by the Carbon
Majors Inquiry. The Philippines Commission on Human Rights is investigating
whether a relatively small group of Northern corporations is aggravating the already
vulnerable livelihoods of Philippine citizens.92 This first legal action against fossil
fuel-intensive corporations in the Global South has been innovative in that it eschews
the normal tort-based approaches93 and focuses instead on an investigation of the
87 Rabab Ali v. Federation of Pakistan, Supreme Court of Pakistan (2016), available at: http://www.lse.ac.
uk/GranthamInstitute/litigation/ali-v-federation-of-pakistan-supreme-court-of-pakistan-2016.
88 Public Interest Litigation Association of Pakistan v. Government of the Punjab, W.P. No. 9137/2012,
Lahore High Court, available at: http://sys.lhc.gov.pk/greenBenchOrders/WP-Environment-9137-12-
30-12-2015.pdf.
89 See Alvarado & Rivas-Ramírez, n. 5 above; Villavicencio Calzadilla, n. 5 above.
90 Supreme Court decision in Spanish and unofficial translation of excerpts into English are available at:
http://www.lse.ac.uk/GranthamInstitute/litigation/future-generation-v-ministry-environment-others.
91 Alvarado & Rivas-Ramírez, n. 5 above, p. 524.
92 See n. 4 above, and A. Savaresi & J. Hartmann, ‘Using Human Rights Law to Address the Impacts of
Climate Change: Early Reflections on the Carbon Majors Inquiry’, presented at the workshop
‘Climate Change Litigation in the Asia Pacific’, University of Singapore, June 2018, available at:
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3277568 (which charts the human rights dimensions of the case). Also
S. Seck, ‘Revisiting Transnational Corporations and Extractive Industries: Climate Justice, Feminism
and State Sovereignty’ (2017) 26(2) Transnational Law & Contemporary Problems, pp. 383–413
(who critiques the choice of entity as only investor-owned carbon majors as well as the underlying
assumptions of international law and the detrimental impacts on climate justice that they entail).
93 Climate litigation scholarship coming from the Global North generally approaches liability from tort-
based claims. However, as Kysar argues, tort-based climate change claims for damages in the US and
in other common law systems in the Global North face a legal system filled with doctrines that are pre-
mised on a classical liberal worldview in which threats such as global climate change simply do not regis-
ter, making it difficult for climate change plaintiffs to obtain favourable judicial decisions. Although legal
principles such as joint and several liabilitymight provide amechanismbywhich to overcome these obsta-
cles, judges have expressed reluctance to attribute responsibility for climate change to any particular indi-
vidual or group of plaintiffs: D.A. Kysar, ‘What Climate Change Can Do About Tort Law’ (2011) 41(1)
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role of carbon major corporations in specific extreme events. The petition was submit-
ted by Greenpeace Southeast Asia, the Philippine Rural Reconstruction Movement to
the Philippines Commission on Human Rights and a group of Filipino citizens. It spe-
cifically situated its requests in the context of the extreme events and slow onset events
experienced by residents in the Philippines and, in particular, the events of Typhoon
Haiyan. The costs of this and other extreme events experienced in the Philippines in
terms of human lives, financial costs to the state, and additional impacts of climate
change on traditional livelihoods such as fishing and agriculture, are extensive and
are highlighted in the petition.
The Commission responded to the petition by opening an investigation, and its
approach has also been innovative. The work of the Commission is framed as a dia-
logue which highlights the voices and experiences of the climate vulnerable, with a
focus on the responsibilities of corporations headquartered in the Global North.94
While the Commission cannot impose fines or force the defendants to reduce emissions,
it can seek the assistance of the UN to encourage the defendants to cooperate, make
recommendations to the government, and issue a fact-finding report.95 The legal con-
clusions of this investigationmay influence further suits in the Global South as well as in
the Global North. In terms of underlying narratives, the investigation can help to
expose the relationship between major emitters based in the Global North and the suf-
fering experienced by people living in the Global South.
Also targeting one of the carbon majors, but crossing the North-South divide, the
ongoing case of Saúl Luciano Lliuya v. RWE was brought in Germany by a plaintiff
from, and in respect of damage incurred in the Global South. Lliuya, a farmer and
mountain guide in Peru, claimed liability from RWE, a pan-European energy company
based in Germany. The damages claimed were proportionate to RWE’s share of global
greenhouse gases, amounting to approximately €17,000. Lliuya based his claim on
paragraph 1004 of the German Civil Code, which deals with interference with prop-
erty.96 The Peruvian Ministry of Health and the National Authority for Civil
Protection determined that Lliuya and the lives of people in his village would be espe-
cially affected by the potential for flooding. The Civil High Court in Hamm in an oral
hearing accepted Lliuya’s reasoning that the defendant’s emissions ‘advanced, to a not
irrelevant degree’ the probability of glacial flooding.97 This unusual and daring lawsuit
Environmental Law, pp. 1–71. For examples of unsuccessful use of tort-based climate change claims
against carbon majors in the Global North, see Native Village of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp.,
663 F. Supp. 2d 863, 877 (N.D. Cal 2009), aff’d, 696 F.3d 849 (9th Cir. 2012).
94 Since it began the investigation, the Philippines Commission on Human Rights has held several hearings
around theworld, garnering significant public attention, with three sittings in the Philippines as well as in
New York (27–28 Sept. 2018) and London (6–9 Nov. 2018). Carbon-major corporations are also facing
litigation claims in the Global North: see L. Benjamin, ‘The Road to Paris Runs Through Delaware:
Climate Litigation and Directors’ Duties’ (2020 forthcoming) Utah Law Review, available at:
https://www.ssrn.com/abstract=3379848.
95 M.L. Banda&S. Fulton, ‘LitigatingClimateChange inNational Courts:Recent Trends andDevelopments
in Global Climate Law’ (2017) 47(2) Environmental Law Reporter, pp. 10121–34, at 10132.
96 Lliuya v. RWE, 23 Nov. 2015 (unauthorized translation provided by Germanwatch e.v.).
97 The voltum was read out in court in Nov. 2017 as a preparatory opinion, but this is an internal court
document and is not publicly available.
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is a real case study to educate judges and the public on how vulnerable populations in
the Global South are disproportionately affected by carbon intensive corporations
headquartered in the Global North.
While there are synergies in Global North and Global South strategic climate litiga-
tion, with an increasing focus on both the role of human rights and carbon major cor-
porations in climate change, the approach taken by litigants in the Global South is
particularly relevant given the precarious nature of law enforcement and human rights
protection in these countries. Following this discussion of key features of emerging cli-
mate jurisprudence, we now identify what may be the main reasons underpinning
innovative approaches and outcomes in Global South strategic climate litigation.
5.   
Pursuing a legal campaign is a lengthy, costly, and risky process for litigants, in both
wealthier and poorer countries. As highlighted in Section 2, litigants in Global South
jurisdictions face additional challenges, from significant capacity constraints to death
threats. Differing legislative backgrounds, judicial histories, and social and political
contexts contribute greatly to the contrasts between Global North and Global South
climate litigation. It is therefore surprising that organizations in the Global South
have been investing time and resources to bring legal cases dealing with climate change,
and that some have achieved a certain degree of success. The Legal Opportunity
Structures approaches offer a useful framework for explaining the variables that condi-
tion access to judicial governance and also seek to account for the role of judges in the
policy output process.98 Bearing in mind the limitations resulting from the selective
nature of the cases examined, we identify two reasons for innovative strategies and out-
comes in the Global South: (i) how litigants are either overcoming or using procedural
requirements for access to environmental justice, which in turn is combined with (ii) the
existence of progressive legislation and judicial approaches to climate change.
5.1. Access to Justice
The existence of a court is only one of the conditions for granting access to justice.
Litigants depend on rules relating to standing, which vary across jurisdictions, in
order to be granted the right of access to courts – individually, collectively, or as a
third party or amicus curiae. Rules governing standing to sue are a crucial dimension
of Legal Opportunity Structures approaches for environmental litigation.99
98 Hilson was among the first to deploy the terms ‘legal opportunity’ and ‘legal opportunity structure’ to
describe the conditions for social movements to pursue their goals through litigation: C. Hilson, ‘New
Social Movements: The Role of Legal Opportunity’ (2002) 9(2) Journal of European Public Policy,
pp. 238–55. Since then many other researchers have been using and developing this framework: see,
e.g., B.M. Wilson & J.C.R. Cordero, ‘Legal Opportunity Structures and Social Movements: The
Effects of Institutional Change on Costa Rican Politics’ (2006) 39(3) Comparative Political Studies,
pp. 325–51; and L. Vanhala, ‘Legal Opportunity Structures and the Paradox of Legal Mobilization by
the Environmental Movement in the UK’ (2012) 46(3) Law & Society Review, pp. 523–56.
99 Vanhala, ibid.
Transnational Environmental Law18
of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S2047102519000268
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. LSE London School of Economics, on 02 Jan 2020 at 17:13:05, subject to the Cambridge Core terms
Inmany developing countries, the requirements for standing have been interpreted strin-
gentlybycourts.100Yet, theGlobalSouthcountrieswherecasesof strategic climate litigation
have been decided (see Table 1) all allow citizen suits in their constitutions and environmen-
tal legislation.101 Countries such as India and the Philippines have allowed broad standing
for individuals and organizations, extending to the unborn in the Philippines.102 South
Asian courts, in particular, have seen much success in using public interest litigation to
address environmental concerns, partly because of judicial support for the achievement of
sustainable development.103 Emeseh cites a number of cases in this region where technical
standing restrictionswere done awaywith, and very broad interpretations given to constitu-
tional provisions to ensure access to the courts in environmental cases.104 Some of these
countries have also attempted to address the geographical remoteness of litigants by sending
specialized buses to remote regions, as illustrated by the Philippines Supreme Court and the
Brazilian stateofAmazonia’sCourtofEnvironmentandAgrarian Issues.105Theprogressive
judicial outcomes identified in strategic climate litigation in the Global South can be under-
stood as part of the history of environmental jurisprudence in these countries, combined
with progressive procedural requirements which aid class action suits.
In addition to standing, financial resources and lack of expertise are yet another hur-
dle that litigants in the Global South need to overcome in order to secure access to just-
ice.106 The existence of legal opportunities is no guarantee that litigants will be
successful in their claims. As Epp argues, ‘combining rights consciousness with a bill
of rights and a willing and able judiciary improves the outlook for a rights revolution,
but material support for sustained pursuit of rights is still crucial’.107 In the context of
climate issues, the adjudication of climate cases often involves complex intersections
100 Emeseh, n. 16 above, p. 603.
101 UN Environment, n. 21 above, p. 187.
102 Supreme Court Rules of Procedure, The Philippines, A.M. No. 09-6-8-SC (2010). The Philippines has a
history of progressive environmentalism, as highlighted byMinors Oposa v. Secretary of the Department
of the Environment and Natural Resources (1994) 33(1) International Legal Materials, pp. 173–206, in
which the Supreme Court ruled that the plaintiffs had standing to represent generations unborn in the
protection of environmental rights.
103 Emeseh, n. 16 above, p. 602.
104 Ibid., citing Shella Zia v.WAPDA, PLD 1994 SC 693 (in which the Pakistan Supreme Court held that the
right to life in the Constitution included the right to a healthy environment), Minors Oposa, ibid. (in
which the Supreme Court of the Philippines allowed the plaintiffs to sue on behalf of future generations),
and Faroque v. Bangladesh, No. 3 Sri Lanka 4–6 July 1997 (in which a broad interpretation of ‘aggrieved
person’ was found under the Bangladesh Constitution).
105 UN Environment, n. 21 above, p. 186.
106 Other constraints are geographical remoteness and scarce government resources: ibid., pp. 184–6.
107 C.R. Epp, The Rights Revolution: Lawyers, Activists, and Supreme Courts in Comparative Perspective
(University of Chicago Press, 1998), p. 17. Whereas the costs rules of a legal system are usually under-
stood as part of Legal Opportunity Structures (e.g., loser-pays acts as a disincentive in taking litigation
because of the risk and uncertainty), financial resources are often not conceptualized. Further discussions
regarding financial hurdles in strategic litigation can be found in C.L. Arrington, ‘Hiding in Plain Sight:
Pseudonymity and Participation in Legal Mobilization’ (2019) 52(2) Comparative Political Studies,
pp. 310–41; L.Vanhala, ‘Shaping the Structure of Legal Opportunities: Environmental NGOs Bringing
International Environmental Procedural Rights Back Home’ (2018) 40(1) Law & Policy, pp. 110–27;
L. Vanhala, ‘Is Legal Mobilization for the Birds? Legal Opportunity Structures and Environmental
Nongovernmental Organizations in the United Kingdom, France, Finland, and Italy’ (2018) 51(3)
Comparative Political Studies, pp. 380–412.
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between social, economic, and political interests. Limited specialist knowledge in the
policy-science nexus can thus severely constrain access to justice.108
To support strategic climate litigation in the Global South, philanthropists have been
providing financial resources as well as technical expertise to allow cases in the Global
South to be filed, and some Northern NGOs have been providing strategic support (e.g.,
defining media and communications strategy) to partner organizations in the Global
South.109As a result, Global South climate cases brought by local communities or indivi-
duals often enjoy the support of localNGOs,which in turnare supported by transnational
cooperation with NGOs located outside the jurisdiction in which the case was brought.
5.2. Progressive Legislation and Judicial Approaches
Domestic legislation is another important dimension of Legal Opportunity Structures.
An existing legal framework that recognizes environmental and human rights facilitates
the defence of these rights in courts. Similarly, progressive judicial approaches are cen-
tral in determining precedents in strategic cases.
Cases of strategic climate litigation in the Global South have relied on using existing
constitutions and legislation rather than adopting the tort-based approaches found in
some cases in the Global North. The adoption of constitutions by many countries
around the world over the past two decades has also been accompanied by an ‘environ-
mental rights revolution’, with environmental problems increasingly being addressed
Table 1 Selection of Global South Strategic Climate Litigation mentioned in this Article, with an Indication
of the Issue Areas They Address
Country Case
Mitigation,
Adaptation, Loss
and Damage
Human Rights
and/or Environmental
Degradation
The Philippines Philippine Reconstruction
Movement and Greenpeace
v. Carbon Majors
Adaptation / loss
and damage
Human rights
Colombia Future Generations v. Ministry
of the Environment and Others
Mitigation Environmental degradation
Germany Saúl Luciano Lliuya v. RWE Adaptation / loss
and damage
Environmental degradation and
human rights (through the impact
of loss and damage)
South Africa EarthLife Africa Johannesburg
v. Minister of Environmental
Affairs and Others
Mitigation Environmental degradation
Pakistan Ashgar Leghari v. Federation of
Pakistan
Adaptation Human rights
108 UN Environment, n. 21 above, p. 183.
109 Peel & Lin (n. 2 above) conducted an analysis of amicus curiae briefs as well as interviews with stake-
holders and found that 43% of Global South litigation enjoyed local or non-local NGO support and,
of those cases, 57% of non-local NGO support was from the Global North.
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through the prism of human rights and constitutionalism.110 A number of countries in
the Global South – such as Brazil, Colombia, Kenya, andMexico – have constitutional
provisions that recognize the right to a healthy environment and the role of the public
prosecutor’s office in the enforcement of this right against private corporations or the
government. In addition to the legal culture and background doctrinal frameworks,
which can provide different interpretive outcomes of climate legislation,111 all countries
in the Global South have already adopted some sort of climate law or policy.112 The
combination of constitutional provisions with a growing body of robust climate change
legislation provides an increasingly solid basis for climate litigation.113
Yet, ultimately, the decision to enforce existing progressive environmental and/or
climate legislation or, in its absence, to decide favourably for litigants in strategic
regulatory climate litigation, depends on the judges. Some judges in the Global South
have been drivers of innovative approaches to climate change. They have explicitly chal-
lenged legal formalism, and have been active outside the courtroom on climate change.
Perhaps the clearest example of progressive judicial decision making which attempts to
overcome institutional lethargy by the government can be found in the Leghari case.114
Judge SyadMansoor Ali Shah identified adaptation as the way forward for Pakistan
and developing countries generally, and interpreted existing national policies accord-
ingly, focusing on adaptation as an integral and synergistic complement to future
national planning on climate change.115 The Court ordered the appointment of a
national focal point on climate change and members of the Climate Change
Commission, and retained jurisdiction to hear progress reports. The Commission
subsequently submitted a number of progress reports to the Court. In 2018 the
Commission and Court determined that the remaining items on the agenda of
the Commission could be implemented by the government, thereby dissolving the
Climate Change Commission and replacing it with a Standing Committee on
Climate Change to assist and ensure the continued implementation of Pakistan’s
2012 National Climate Change Policy and its framework Climate Change Policy
(2014–30). During the progress of the case, a new Climate Change Act was passed
110 G. Ganguly, J. Setzer & V. Heyvaert, ‘If at First You Don’t Succeed: Suing Corporations for Climate
Change’ (2018) 38(4) Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, pp. 841–68. R. O’Gorman, ‘Environmental
Constitutionalism: A Comparative Study’ (2017) 6(3) Transnational Environmental Law, pp. 435–62,
at 435–6.
111 E. Scotford & S. Minas, ‘Probing the Hidden Depth of Climate Law: Analysing National Climate
Legislation’ (2019) 28(1) Review of European, Comparative and International Environmental Law,
pp. 67–81, at 72.
112 Some countries have climate laws or policies which are broad and integrative in scope, such as Mexico’s
General Law on Climate Change. Others that do not have discrete climate legislation rely on climate-
compatible development plans and adaptation and disaster management: M. Nachmany et al., ‘The
2015 Global Climate Legislation Study: A Review of Climate Legislation in 99 Countries. Summary
for Policy-makers’, GLOBE & Grantham Research Institute on Climate Change and the Environment,
2015, p. 16; see also Townshend et al., ‘How National Legislation Can Help to Solve Climate
Change’ (2013) 3(5) Nature Climate Change, pp. 430–4, at 430.
113 Environmental LawAllianceWorldwide (ELAW), ‘HoldingCorporations Accountable for Damaging the
Climate’, 2014, available at: https://www.elaw.org/system/files/elaw.climate.litigation.report.pdf.
114 Ashgar Leghari v. Federation of Pakistan. n. 6 above.
115 Ibid., paras 6–7.
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in 2017, illustrating how climate litigation and regulatory progress can have a coopera-
tive relationship. While there is some scepticism as to whether the new Act will be fully
implemented,116 the objects and reasons section of the Act notes the extreme vulner-
ability of the country to climate change, and the Act was passed as a result of renewed
political will on the issue.117 The judiciary in this case took on significant policy and
regulatory activities, essentially stepping into the shoes of government and establishing
and directing policymaking initiatives and institutions.
Similarly, a progressive and heterodox legal reasoning was followed by the
Colombian Supreme Court in the decision adopted in Future Generations v. Ministry
of the Environment and Others. Alvarado and Rivas-Ramírez highlight how different
this outcome was from the traditionally moderate jurisprudence usually adopted when
applying public interest-oriented constitutional rights. The decision discussed ‘inter-
generational equality and solidarity, private liability and accountability for climate
change, and human dependence on the environment – topics rarely, if ever, debated
by the Supreme Court’.118 However, the implementation of ambitious judicial orders
can be challenging. Despite the decision, deforestation in the Amazon has increased
over the past year, prompting the plaintiffs to seek a declaration that the government
and other defendants have failed to fulfil the orders of the Supreme Court.119
These progressive judicial approaches may be an attempt by the judiciary to acknow-
ledge the extreme vulnerability of their populations to climate change, while at the same
time circumventing deficiencies in existing legislation or capacity constraints in enforce-
ment. Indeed, decisions given in these strategic cases suggest that judges in the Global
South are open to adapting their traditional role of administering justice to the
challenges posed by climate change litigation, even if this means holding their own
government accountable.120 It is possible that climate litigation finds a stronger footing
in jurisdictions that have express constitutional provisions on environmental protec-
tion.121 Nevertheless, these cases demonstrate that progress can also be made where
116 R.S. Khan, ‘Pakistan Passes Climate Change Act, Reviving Hopes – and Skepticism’, Reuters, 24 Mar.
2017, available at: https://www.reuters.com/article/us-pakistan-climatechange-lawmaking/pakistan-
passes-climate-change-act-reviving-hopes-and-skepticism-idUSKBN16V19N.
117 Ibid.
118 Alvarado & Rivas-Ramírez, n. 5 above, pp. 522–4. Nevertheless, the Columbian courts have a judicial
history in innovative approaches to environmental protection. For example, in 2016, the Sixth
Chamber of Review of the Constitutional Court of Columbia granted rights to the Atrato River, its
basin and tributaries (Center for Social Justice Studies et al. v. Presidency of the Republic et al.,
Constitutional Court of Colombia, Judgment T-622/16, unofficial English translation available at:
http://files.harmonywithnatureun.org/uploads/upload838.pdf).
119 S.A. Sierra, ‘The Colombian Government Has Failed to Fulfil the Supreme Court’s Landmark Order to
Protect the Amazon’,Dejusticia, 5 April 2019, available at: https://www.dejusticia.org/en/the-colombian-
government-has-failed-to-fulfill-the-supreme-courts-landmark-order-to-protect-the-amazon.
120 Banda & Fulton, n. 95 above, p. 10131. The engagement of activist judges with climate change is also
observed transnationally in the Oslo Principles on Global Climate Change Obligations to Reduce
Climate Change (available at: https://globaljustice.yale.edu/oslo-principles-global-climate-change-obli-
gations) and the Climate Principles for Enterprises (available at: https://climateprinciplesforenterprises.
org). While the Principles may remain a progressive interpretation of fiduciary duties, judicial experts
anticipate more progressive judicial decision making along these lines, particularly by activist jurists,
as the threat of climate change and associated damage further materializes.
121 Ibid., p. 10123.
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no environmental constitutional provisions exist, provided judges are willing and able
to take action on climate change. As exemplified by theLeghari case, a court that is will-
ing to exercise an active role can guide and build regulatory capacity even where the
statutory and institutional framework is ineffective.122 However, it might also be
that in some of these cases judges have taken bold decisions on climate cases without
realizing the extent to which their decisions are innovative.123
6.   
Based on the initial trends of strategic climate litigation in the Global South and taking
into consideration factors that contribute to this movement, some lessons can be
gleaned. In contrast to Global North cases, strategic climate litigation in the Global
South is generally not asking for more ambitious regulatory action to be taken by
governments, even if this is an indirect outcome of the case. This may be an implicit
acknowledgement of capacity constraints as well as recognition of the climate equity
implications involved. Asking national governments to implement stringent mitigation
measures at the expense of poverty reduction, energy security needs or other develop-
ment agendas will be taxing for the judiciary in the Global South. This is particularly
pertinent in small developing countries. However, enforcing existing environmental
legislation, protecting ecosystems, boosting adaptation efforts, and enhancing institu-
tional structures – all of which may have mitigation co-benefits – can be easier tasks
to achieve through the courts.
Similarly, strategic climate litigation in the Global South does not rely extensively on
traditional tort-based approaches to climate damage against either state or non-state
actors. Instead, litigation in the Global South relies on existing legislation to achieve
climate aims, and utilizes human rights-based approaches. These approaches can
find synergies with litigation in the Global North which also, and so far successfully,
adopts rights-based approaches. Yet, rights-based approaches to climate litigation in
the Global South make even more sense considering the high vulnerability of their
populations to climate impacts. Where specific climate legislation does not exist, plain-
tiffs instead focus on existing legislation or human rights instruments to achieve
climate-related goals.
In this context, climate litigation in the Global South may continue to lead to
successful outcomes and regulatory progress. These key features of strategic climate liti-
gation in the Global South may establish new strategic directions in climate litigation
going forward.
Furthermore, it would be particularly helpful to most vulnerable populations if
climate litigation in the Global South were to target addressing adaptation to climate
change. While, so far, most Global South climate lawsuits focus on mitigation
issues (e.g., challenging coal-fired power plants and mining of coal, preventing
122 Ibid., p. 10134.
123 Wibisana&Cornelius (n. 52 above) argue that judges might have been oblivious to the fact that they had
established a novel and unique jurisprudence.
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carbon-intensive practices such as timber logging and oil palm cultivation),124 adapta-
tion efforts by governments pay dividends in that they save lives and can be compatible
with existing development plans and efforts. Finding co-benefits between developmen-
tal and climate mitigation and adaptation efforts may be a key innovation by Global
South judges, which in turn can inform policymakers in the Global South.125
It is also possible that climate litigation in the Global South will gather pace as the
impacts of climate change become more frequent and severe in these countries.126
For instance, the island state of Vanuatu is considering litigation for climate impacts
from both Global North governments and corporations located in the Global
North.127While it is unclear whether the positive outcomes so far achieved will spread
to other countries in the Global South which lack these legal characteristics, it is also
important not to reduce the significance of a judgment to its dispositive part. Even if
a claim is dismissed, a judicial decision may highlight a need for legal change and/or
help to raise social awareness, thus contributing to behavioural change.128
Another question is whether the regulatory impacts and frameworks established in
the context of Global North cases should be applied, and if necessary adjusted, in the
context of the growing number of climate litigation cases in the Global South. Synergies
with litigation in the Global South appear in the EIA realm. The African EIA climate
cases – especially if their results are amplified by South-South partnering in subsequent
cases – signal a potential growth area for future Global South climate litigation.129
While there have not been many cases in Africa, and procedural difficulties remain,130
if this trend takes off it would mirror the development of jurisprudence in climate
litigation ‘hotspots’ in the Global North such as the US and Australia. In addition,
given the history of judicial activism on environmental provisions in South Asian
courts, we might observe more cases that uphold or advance climate change protection
in this region as well.
124 This was a surprising finding for Peel & Lin, n. 2 above, p. 685.
125 Some governments in the Global South (e.g., Ethiopia, Rwanda, South Korea) are already passing legis-
lation which focuses on climate-resilient development and green-growth strategies: see Townshend et al.,
n. 112 above, p. 431.
126 UN Environment and Sabin Center for Climate Change Law, n. 35 above, p. 25, and Sabin Center, n. 34
above, p. 25.
127 D. Drugmand, ‘Tiny Pacific Island Could File First National Climate Liability Suit’, Climate Liability
News, 26 Nov. 2018, available at: https://www.climateliabilitynews.org/2018/11/26/vanuatu-climate-
liability-suit.
128 Ganguly, Setzer & Heyvaert, n. 110 above, p. 866.
129 Peel and Lin, n. 2 above. In Australia, EIA climate cases have consolidated the practice of including cli-
mate change considerations in EIA undertaken for projects with substantial greenhouse gas emissions or
the potential to be affected by climate change consequences such as sea level rise: see J. Peel, H. Osofsky&
A. Foerster, ‘Shaping the “Next Generation” of Climate Change Litigation in Australia’ (2017) 41(2)
Melbourne University Law Review, pp. 793–844, at 796.
130 Emeseh, n. 16 above.
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7.  
For decades, Northern countries have been advocating collective action to protect the
environment, while Southern countries have insisted that Northern countries take the
lead in addressing climate change. This divide is motivated in part by tensions regarding
historic responsibility for environmental degradation, concerns regarding sovereignty
over natural resources, and the desire to prioritize poverty reduction and development
over environmental conservation in the Global South. The new climate litigation emer-
ging in the Global South could help to reframe the limitations observed by the climate
justice movement in the context of a persistent divide between countries in the Global
North and the Global South over core environmental issues. To achieve positive out-
comes plaintiffs and judicial actors in the Global South are finding innovative ways
to overcome significant capacity constraints, legislative deficiencies, procedural and
implementation hurdles, and sometimes unsafe political environments.
Litigation does not only circumvent and bypass political partisan divides;131 it can
also create fluid pathways between multiple actors at the subnational, national, and
international levels.132 However, litigation can perhaps be more useful in the Global
South in its regulatory role of creating pathways between fragmented institutional
actors. It could bind together previously fragmented governance structures in the
Global South to ensure that they focus on national climate goals, whether they be miti-
gation, adaptation, disaster management, or a combination of those aims. This regula-
tory outcome has already been highlighted by the progressive outcomes of the Leghari
case where the judge mandated coherent action by government actors over time until
institutional coherence on the issue was achieved.
The valuable role of litigation as a regulatory tool has begun to be seized upon in the
Global South. As populations in these countries are the most vulnerable to climate
impacts, and as impacts increase, the observations gleaned from an initial spate of
cases may solidify into a litigation trend. The regulatory impact of this litigation in
the context of the Global Southmay therefore provide lessons and open up newavenues
for progress on climate change in these highly vulnerable countries which suffer from
capacity constraints. Despite these constraints, this initial spate of strategic litigation
attempts to overcome the traditional North-South divide, with litigants relying on
human rights arguments, existing legislation, and progressive procedural rules to
achieve climate-resilient development. The latest strategies and decisions from courts
in the Global South suggest that it might be possible for the Global South to innovate
and establish new trends towards climate change adaptation and mitigation in an ever
more transnational climate jurisprudence.
131 H.M. Osofsky & J. Peel, ‘Energy Partisanship’ (2016) 65(3) Emory Law Journal, pp. 695–794, at 695
(although the authors note (at 761) that courts are not a ‘panacea’ for partisanship).
132 H.M. Osofsky, ‘The Role of Climate Change Litigation in Establishing the Scale of Energy Regulation’
(2011) 101(4) Annals of the Association of American Geographers, pp. 775–82.
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